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274 ANDERSON tI. MART [47 C.2d 
[So F. No. 19535. In Bank. Nov. 16, 1956.] 
DOROTHY A. ANDERSON, R~spondent, V. MAUDIE O. 
MART, as Administratrix, etc., Appellant. 
[1] Divorce-..;....Permanent Alimony-Effect of Agreement of Parties. 
-Husband and wife made provisions for support of the wife 
and a minor child an integral part of their property settle-
ment agreement where they entered into the agreement for the 
purpose of avoiding expense, delay, inconvenience and litigation 
with respect to the settlement of their property rights and 
obligations, released each party from all claims and demands 
of the other, agreed that the wife should have the care, custody 
and control of the child subject to the recognized premise of 
law that they could control such custody only to the extent 
that their agreement coincided with the order which any 
eourt of competent jurisdiction might make for the best in-
terest of the child, and expressly provided that the agreement 
was to be a full and final settlement of the property rights 
of the parties and of all claims which either might have 
against the other. 
[2] Id.-Permanent Alimony-Duration of Allowance-~ermfna­
tion.-Where provisions of a property settlement agreement 
between husband and wife establish that a provision" for 
monthly payments for support and maintenance of the wife 
and a minor child was an inseparable part of the agreement 
and not a provision for alimony, and where at the time such 
agreement was executed such payments did not terminate on 
the husband's death or the wife's remarriage unless the agree-
ment so provided, failure so to provide clearly indicates that 
the payments should not so terminate and fortifies the con-
elusion that a separable provision for alimony was not in-
tended. 
[3] Id.-Permanent Alfmony-Effect of Agreement of Parties.-
A provision in a property settlement agreement between 
husband and wife that monthly payments for support of the 
wife and a minor child were to be subject to court approval does 
not establish that they were alimony, and the fact that the 
parties expressly recognized that they could not by tneir 
agreement control the court's power to make orders for the 
support of their child does not conflict with their expressed 
[1] See Cal.J'ur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 217; Am.J'ur., 
Divorce and Separation, § 586 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3J Divorce, § 203; [2] Divorce, § 214; 
[4J Divorce, § 215; [5] Judgments, § 115; [6J Divorce, § 204; [7] 
Divorce, § 239; [8] Divorce, § 295. 
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intention that as between themselves their agreement should 
be final and conclusive. 
[4] ld.-Permanent Alimony-Duration of Allowance-Termina-
tion.-Provisions of a property settlement agreement between 
husband and wife that "each party does hereby waive and quit-
claim any right to share in the estate of the other party, either 
under a Will or by the laws of succession, or by family allow-
ance, or otherwise," and that "Neither party shall at any time 
hereafter contract any debt, charge, or liability against the 
property or estate of the other party, and, in the event either 
party shall do so, he or she will save the other party harmless 
and free from loss occasioned by such act," refer only to rights 
or obligations not assumed or otherwise provided for in the 
agreement and do not prevent the enforcement of contractual 
obligations for support and maintenance of the wife given in the 
agreement in consideration of rights of one spouse in the prop-
erty or estate of the other growing out of the marital rela-
tionship, and hence do not preclude application of the rule 
that payments agreed to as an inseparable part of the property 
settlement do not terminate on the husband's death. 
[6] Judgments-Relief Granted.-The primary purpose of Code 
Civ. Proc., § 580, declaring that relief granted to plaintiff, 
if there be no answer, cannot exceed that which he shall have 
demanded in his complaint, is to insure adequate notice to 
defendant of the demands made on him. 
[6] Divorce-Permanent Alimony-Pleading.-Where plaintiff, in 
her complaint for divorce, alleged that there was no community 
property, "a property settlement agreement having been 
entered into between the parties," where defendant, who ad-
mitted this allegation, was aware of the terms of the agree-
ment and knew that it provided for a designated monthly 
payment for support of plaintiff and a child subject to court 
approval, and where the complaint contained no allegation 
attacking the validity of the agreement and plaintiff prayed for 
an order for payment of precisely the sums agreed to therein, 
defendant had adequate notice that the award sought was that 
provided for in the agreement, and the reasonable interpreta-
tion of such complaint was that plaintiff was not abandoning 
the contract but was seeking the support provided therein. 
[7] ld.-Enforcement of Awards.-Where a divorced wife, in her 
action against the administratrix of the former husband's 
estate to enforce her claim to support money, did not secure, 
and under the divorce decree could not secure, anything to 
which she was not entitled under a property settlement agree-
ment, defendant could raise no valid objection to its enforce-
ment as a contract obligation. 
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[8] Id.-Support of Ohildren-Orders Subsequent to Decree.-
Where a divorce decree orders payments for support of the 
wife and a minor child, pursuant to a property settlement 
agreement, the amount of payments cannot be reduced during 
the child's minority, but the obligation to pay the amount 
attributable to the child's support terminates on his reaching 
majority, and when the decree is silent on the question of 
allocation· the trial court may determine the allocation in 
subsequent proceedings. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Contra 
Costa County. Homer W. Patterson, Judge. Reversed with 
directions. 
Action by a divorced wife against administratrix of former 
husband's estate to enforce her claim to support money. 
Judgment for plainti1l' reversed with directions. 
Johnson & Harmon and Robert H. Johnson for Appellant. 
Pasquinelli, O'Connor & Panelli and Timothy A. O'Connor 
for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-On March 12, 1948, plainti1I Dorothy A. 
Anderson and decedent William E. Anderson executed a prop-
erty settlement agreement. On June 22, 1948, plainti1l' filed 
an action against decedent for divorce. In her complaint she 
alleged jurisdictional facts, extreme cruelty, her fitness for 
child custody, and that she "does not have sufficient money, 
means or property with which to support and maintain her-
self and the minor child of the parties hereto, and that the 
sum of $60.00 per month is a reasonable and necessary sum 
to be allowed said plainti1l' as and for the support and main-
tenance of said plainti1l' and the minor child of the parties 
hereto." She alleged that "there is no community property 
• • • , a property settlement having been entered into by and 
between the parties." She prayed for a dissolution of the 
marriage, for custody of the child, and that "the defendant 
be required to pay to plainti1l' the sum of $60 per month as 
and for the support and maintenance of said plaintiff and the 
minor child" and "for such other and further relief as the 
court deems meet and proper." There was no request that 
the court approve the agreement or incorporate it in its 
decree. 
The decedent filed an answer in propria persona admitting 
) 
) 
Nov. 1956] ANDERSON tI. MART 
[47 C.2d 274; 303 P.2d 1139] 
277 
all allegations except the allegation of extreme cruelty and 
the allegations with respect to support. He made no further 
appearance in the action, and it was tried as a default action. 
On July 26,1948, an interlocutory decree was entered grant-
ing the divorce, awarding custody of the child to plaintiff, and 
ordering decedent to "pay to plaintiff the sum of $60.00 per 
month as and for the support and maintenance of said plain-
tiff and the minor child .... " It also decreed that the prop-
erty settlement agreement "be, and the same is hereby ap-
proved and ratified, and the terms thereof are incorporated 
herein with the same force and effect as if set forth in full 
herein. " Decedent did not appeal, and on October 11, 1949, a 
final decree of divorce was entered, incorporating the terms of 
the interlocutory decree. Decedent remarried, and his widow, 
Maudie O. Mart, who remarried after his death, is the ad-
ministratrix herein. 
On September 24, 1951, plaintiff and her attorney signed 
and delivered to decedent a stipulation entitled in the court 
and cause and providing that the interlocutory and final de-
crees "may be modified so as to provide that the defendant 
pay to plaintiff the sum of Fifty Dollars ($50.00) a month 
as and for the support and maintenance of plaintiff and the 
minor child of the parties hereto, and that the above-entitled 
court may cause to be made and entered herein its order so 
modifying said decrees." The stipulation was not filed, and 
the decrees were not modified, but thereafter decedent paid 
plaintiff only $50 per month. On April 5, 1952, decedent died. 
Plaintiff presented to the administratrix of his estate a claim 
for $60 per month for her life expectancy. The claim was 
rejected, and plaintiff brought this action. 
The trial court found that the estate was indebted to 
plaintiff on the property settlement agreement and that the 
agreement was incorporated in and made a part of the decree 
in the divorce action and that the provision for support therein 
was an inseparable part of an integrated property settlement 
agreement and therefore entered judgment for plaintiff for 
$14,190 to be paid out of the funds of the estate in due course 
of administration. That sum was fixed b~" the court as the pres-
ent value of $50 per month for plaintiff's life expectancy. De-
fendant administratrix appeals. 
In their agreement plaintiff and decedent provided: 
"WHEREAS, there is one (1) child the issue of said marriage 
of the parties hereto . . • ; and, 
) 
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"WHEREAS, the parties hereto desire to avoid expense, 
delay, inconvenience, and litigation with respect to the settle-
ment of their property rights and obligations; • . . 
"NolV, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises, and 
in consideration of the mutual promises and undertakings 
hereinafter set forth, and intending to be legally bound, the 
parties hereto do mutually agree and promise as follows: 
"FmsT: That ... each party is hereby released and ab-
solved from any and all claims and demands of the other, 
including all claims of either party upon the other party for 
support and maintenance as husband and wife, or otherwise, 
it being understood that this instrument is intended to settle 
the rights of the parties hereto in all respects, except as here-
inafter provided. . . • 
"SECOND: That any and all property acquired by either 
party from and after the date hereof shall be the sole and 
separate property of the party acquiring the same; and each 
party does hereby grant to the other party all such future 
acquisitions of property as the sole and separate property 
of the party acquiring the same. 
"THIRD: That each party shall have the immediate right to 
dispose of or bequeath by Will his or her interests in and to 
any and all property belonging to him or her from and after 
the date hereof, and said right shall extend to all of the afore-
said future acquisitions of property as well as to all property 
set over to either party under this agreement. 
"FOURTH: That each party does hereby waive and quitclaim 
any right to share in the estate of the other party, either 
under a Will or by the laws of succession, or by family allow-
ance, or otherwise. 
"FIFTH: That each party does hereby accept the provisions 
herein made for him or for her in full satisfaction of his 
or her right to the community property of the parties, or 
other property acquired after marriage by either party, and 
in full satisfaction of his or her right, if any, to alimony or 
support and maintenance. Neither party shall at any time 
hereafter contract any debt, charge, or liability against the 
property or estate of the other party, and, in the event either 
party shall do so, he or she will save the other party harmless 
and free from loss occasioned by such act." 
Provisions were then made for the division of the property. 
Bank deposits amounting to $5,726.87 and United States 
War Savings bonds having an approximate maturity value 
of $2,500 were divided equally; decedent received the better 
-) 
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of two automobiles and a vacant lot, appraised in his estate 
at $600; and plaintiff received the home, sold later for $6,000, 
and furnishings. 
Paragraph 15 provided: "It is understood and recognized 
by the parties hereto that they can control the custody of the 
minor child of the parties hereto only to the extent that their 
agreement coincides with the order which any Court of com-
petent jurisdiction may make for the best interest of said 
child. Subject to such recognized premise of law, the parties 
hereto agree that the Wife shall have the care, custody and 
control of the minor child, with reasonable right of visitation 
vested in Husband. " 
Parag;aph 16 provided: "Subject to approval by any Court 
of competent jurisdiction, Husband agrees to pay to Wife 
the sum of Sixty ($60.00) Dollars per month as and for the 
support and maintenance of Wife and the minor child of the 
parties hereto, commencing forthwith and continuing in a 
like sum each and every month thereafter." 
Paragraph 18 provided in part: ". . • this agreement is 
intended to be, and is, a full, final and complete settlement 
of the property rights of the parties hereto and of all claims 
which either party has or might claim to have had against the 
other, were it not for this agreement. • • ." 
Paragraph 19 provided: "This agreement can be modified, 
cancelled, or rescinded only by a written agreement for that 
purpose, executed by the parties hereto. • • ." 
[1] In Messenger v. Messenger, 46 Ca1.2d 619, 628 [297 
P.2d 988], we held that when "the parties have clearly ex-
pressed their 'purpose of fixing and adjusting their persoI).al 
and property rights,' have provided that the provision for 
alimony is 'for and in consideration of the permanent and 
lasting division and settlement of all their property rights of 
every kind and nature,' and the wife has waived 'all right to 
future maintenance and support . . ., except as herein other-
wise expressly provided,' the conclusion is inescapable that 
they have made the provisions for support and maintenance 
an integral and inseparable part of their property settlement 
agreement. With such conclusive evidence of integration, 
the provisions for support and maintenance or alimony would 
be subject to modification only if the parties expressly 80 
provided." It is abundantly clear from the second whereas 
clause, the now therefore clause, and the first, fifth, and 
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eighteenth paragraphs quoted above, that the agreement in the 
present case falls squarely within the foregoing rule. 
[2] Defendant contends, however, that the failure of the 
agreement to provide for the termination of the payments 
on the death of decedent or remarriage of plaintiff and the 
provision that the payments were to be subject to the approval 
of the court, compel the conclusion that the provision for 
monthly payments was for alimony. Accordingly, she con-
cludes that it could be modified by the court and that the 
obligation it imposed terminated on decedent's death. If it 
appeared from other provisions that separable alimony pay-
ments were intended, the omission of termination dates could 
be explained, as defendant contends, on the theory that the 
payments would terminate on the death of decedent (see 
Miller v. Superior Court, 9 Cal.2d 733, 737 [72 P.2d 868] ; 
Roberts v. Higgins, 122 Cal.App. 170, 171 [9 P.2d 517]) or 
remarriage of plaintiff. (See Civ. Code, § 139.) The other 
provisions of the agreement established, however, that the pro-
vision for monthly payments was an inseparable part of the 
property settlement and not a provision for alimony, and 
at the time the agreement was executed- such payments did 
not terminate on the death of the husband or the remarriage 
of the wife unless the agreement so provided. (Parker v. 
Parker, 193 Cal. 478,480-481 [225 P. 447] ; Lane v. Bradley, 
124 Cal.App.2d 661, 665 [268 P.2d 1092]; Anthony v. 
Anthony, 94 Cal.App.2d 507, 511 [211 P.2d 331] ; Hamilton 
v. Hamilton, 94 Cal.App.2d 293, 300 [210 P.2d 750] ; Estate 
of Mesmer, 94 Cal.App. 97, 103 [270 P. 732] ; see Miller v. 
Superior Court, supra, 9 Ca1.2d 733, 737; Pearman v. Pear-
man, 104 Cal.App.2d 250, 255 [231 P.2d 101]; Gosnell v. 
Webb, 66 Cal.App.2d 518,521 [152 P.2d 463].) Under these 
circumstances the failure so to provide clearly indicates that 
the payments should not so terminate and fortifies the con-
clusion that a separable provision for alimony was not in-
tended. 
[3] The contention that the provision that the payments 
were to be subject to the approval of the court establishes that 
-In 1951 section 139 was amended to provide in part that "Except 
as otherwise agreed by the parties in writing, the obligation of any party 
in any decree, judgment or order for the support and maintenance of 
the other party shall terminate upon the death of the obligor or upon 
the remarriage of the other party." Since the agreement in this ease 
was executed, and the decree entered, in 1948, the effect of the 1951 
amendment on the interpretation of similar agreements and decrees made 
after its enactment is not before us. 
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they were alimony is likewise without merit. Thus the parties 
had expressly recognized that any agreement affecting the 
interests of their child was subject to the approval of the 
court, and since the monthly payments were to be made for 
the support of both plaintiff and the child, it was appropriate 
that a provision for court approval should be included. The 
fact that tbe parties recognized that they could not by their 
agreement control the court's power to make orders for the 
support of their child in no way conflicts with their clearly 
expressed intention that as between themselves their agree-
ment should be final and conclusive. (See Puckett v. Puckett, 
21 Ca1.2d 833, 839, 842-843 [136 P.2d 1].) That this was 
their understanding is further indicated by the fact that 
when a modification was desired by decedent and agreed to 
by plaintiff, it was negotiated pursuant to paragraph 19, 
which provided that the agreement could only be modified "by 
a written agreement for that purpose." 
[4] It is contended that the provision in the fourth para-
graph that •• each party does hereby waive and quitclaim any 
right to share in the estate of the other party, either under 
a Will or by the laws of succession, or by family allowance, 
Of" otherwise," and the provision of the fifth paragraph that 
"Neither party shall at any time hereafter contract any debt, 
charge, or liability against the property or estate of the other 
party, and, in the event either party shall do so, he or she 
will save the other party harmless and free from loss occasioned 
by such act" establish that the payments were to terminate on 
decedent's death. (Emphasis added.) It is obvious that the. 
quoted provision of the fifth paragraph is irrelevant in this 
respect since it refers to any debt, charge, or liability to be 
contracted hereafter and not to the obligations assumed in the 
agreement itself. It is an obligation assumed in the agree· 
ment itself that plaintiff is now seeking to enforce. It is 
also obvious that the fourth paragraph refers only to any 
rights to share in the estate not otherwise provided for in 
the agreement. It is similar in its broad language to the 
provisions of the second and third paragraphs in which each 
of the parties waived all rights in any of the property assigned 
to the other and any property to be thereafter acquired by 
the other. Taken together these provisions make clear that 
neither party should have any rights in the property or the 
estate of the other growing out of the marital relationship. 
The agreement was executed to settle and dispose of those 
rights in exchange for those provided in the agreement, anel . 
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manifestly the agreement would be self-stultifying if the mu-
tual relinquishment of marital rights was so broad as to pre-
vent the enforcement of the contractual obligations given in 
consideration therefor. Accordingly, since it is clear that none 
of these provisions was intended to prevent plaintiff from en-
forcing her rights under the agreement and since paragraph 
four makes no distinction between rights accruing before or 
after decedent's death, it has no bearing on the applicability 
of the rule that payments agreed to as an inseparable part 
of a property settlement do not terminate on the death of the 
husband. 
Defendant contends that the pleadings in the divorce action 
did not put the property settlement agreement in issue and 
that since plaintiff did not pray for any relief with respect 
to property, the court had no power to approve the property 
settlement agreement and incorporate it into its decree. (See 
Burtnett v. King, 33 Cal.2d 805 [205 P.2d 657, 12 A.L.R.2d 
333].) 
Code of Civil Procedure, section 580, provides: "The relief 
granted to the plaintiff, if there be no answer, cannot exceed 
that which he shall have demanded in his complaint; but 
in any other case, the court may grant him any relief con-
sistent with the case made by the complaint and embraced 
within the issue." If under the pleadings, the allegation of 
plaintiff's need for an award of $60 per month for the child's 
and her support and her prayer therefor may reasonably 
be interpreted as made pursuant to the provisions of the prop-
erty settlement agreement, the court, in basing its award on 
the agreement of the parties, did not grant relief in excess of 
that demanded in the complaint or inconsistent with the ease 
made by the complaint and embraced within the issue. 
[6] The primary purpose of section 580 is to insure ade-
quate notice to the defendant of the demands made upon him. 
(Burtnett v. King, supra, 33 Ca1.2d 805, 811; Pacific Mut. Life 
Ins. Co. v. McConnell, 44 Ca1.2d 715, 727 [285 P.2d 636].) 
[6] In the present case it is clear that decedent was given 
adequate notice that the award sought was that provided 
for in the agreement. In her complaint plaintiff alleged that 
there was no community property "a property settlement 
agreement having been entered into by and between the 
parties. " Decedent admitted this allegation, and he was 
aware of the terms of the agreement. He knew that it pro-
vided for the payment of $60 per month for the support of 
plaintiff and the child subject to the approval of the court. 
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The complaint contained no allegatil)n attacking the va1it'lity 
of the agreement (c/., Smith v. Smith, 40 Ca1.2d 461, 464 [254 
P.2d 1]), and plaintiff prayed for an order for the payment 
of precisely the sums agreed to therein. Under these circum-
stances, the reasonable interpretation of the complaint is that 
plaintiff was not abandoning the contract, but was seeking 
the support provided therein. The agreement contemplated 
court approval of the provision for support, and in her allega-
tions that the payments sought were necessary and reasonable. 
plaintiff set forth her grounds for having the court approve 
them. 
[7] Moreover, the pleadings and the findings in this action 
would support the judgment on the ground that decedent 
was liable under the terms of the contract itself even if the 
support provision of the agreement was not merged into the 
divorce decree. At the trial plaintiff sought and secured a 
decree awarding her support pursuant to her agreement. She 
has never received larger payments than the agreement pro-
vided, and she has never attempted to secure the benefits 
of an alimony award by seeking an increase in the amount 
of the payments. Had she attempted to secure the benefits 
of an alimony decree by attacking the jurisdiction of the 
court to make the support award pursuant to the agreement, 
she would have been estopped to attack the decree she pro-
cured. (Whitlow v. Superior Court, 87 Ca1.App.2d 175, 
185 [196 P.2d 590] ; Estate 0/ Smith, 86 Cal.App.2d 456, 470 
[195 P.2d 842]; Seymour v. Seymour, 18 Cal.App.2d 481, 
483-484 [64 P.2d 168] ; see 1 Witkin, California Procedure, 
412-413.) Since plaintiff did not secure, and under the divorce 
decree could not secure, anything to which she was not entitled 
under her agreement, defendant could raise no valid objection 
to its enforcement as a contract obligation. 
The trial court fixed the amount of the judgment as the 
present value of $50 per month for plaintiff's life expectancy 
of approximately 24 years. The payments were ordered, how-
ever, for the support of both plaintiff and the minor child. 
[8] Although the amount of the payments cannot be reduced 
during the minority of the child (Puckett v. Puckett, supra, 
21 Ca1.2d 833, 843), the obligation to pay tile amount thereof 
attributable to the child's support terminates on his reaching 
his majority, and when the decree is silent on the question of 
allocation, the trial court may determine the allocation in 
subsequent proceedings. (Hopkins v. Hopkins, 46 Ca1.2d 313, 
315-316 [294 P.2d 1] ; Meek v. Meek, 51 Cal.App.2d 492, 495, 
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497 [125 P.2d 117] ; Putnam v. Putnam, 51 Ca1.App.2d 696, 
699 [125 P.2d 525].) It should have done so in this case and 
awarded plaintiff the present value of $50 per month for the 
period of the child's minority plus the present value of the 
amount attributable to plaintiff's support for the remainder of 
her life expectancy. 
The judgment is reversed with directions to the trial court 
to redetermine the amount thereof in accord with this opinion. 
Each party shall bear her own costs on this appeal. 
Gibson, C. J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I concur in the 
result reached by the majority insofar as it holds that the 
minor child should not receive support from the estate of its 
deceased father except until it reaches its majority and that 
the trial court should be directed to determine the amount 
to be allocated to it out of the total support payments until 
that time. I dissent from that part of the majority opinion 
which holds that plaintiff, the first wife of the decedent, is 
entitled to receive any part of the support provided for from 
the estate of the decedent. 
I am of the opinion that Paragraph SIXTEENTH of the agree-
ment is, and was intended by the parties, to be severable from 
the balance of the agreement. Paragraph SIXTEENTH provides 
that" Subject to the approval by any Court of competent juris-
diction, Husband agrees to pay to Wife the sum of Sixty 
($60.00) Dollars per month as and for the support and mainte-
nance of Wife and the minor child of the parties hereto, 
commencing forthwith and continuing in a like sum each and 
every month thereafter." The property settlement division 
was set forth in preceding paragraphs and provided for an 
almost equal division of the community property of the parties. 
The provision for $60.00 per month was obviously not con-
sidered by the parties as equalizing the division of the property 
and it was made expressly subject to court approval, which 
the property division had not' been. It seems very obvious 
that this case does not fall within the rule of the Messenger 
ease (Messenger v. Messenger, 46 Ca1.2d 619, 628 [297 P.2d 
988]) where a majority of this court held that the alimony 
provision was clearly for and in consideration of the perma-
nent and lasting division and settlement of all their property 
rights of every kind and nature. No such provision is found 
in the case at bar. 
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In plaintiff's complaint for divorce she made the foliowing 
allegations: "That there is no community property the 
result of said marriage of the parties hereto, a property settle' 
ment agreement having been entered into by and between 
the parties"; and "That plaintiff does not have sufficient 
money, means or property with which to support and maintain 
herself and the minor child of the parties hereto, and that the 
sum of $60.00 per month is a reasonable and necessary sum 
to be allowed to said plaintiff as and for the support and 
maintenance of said plaintiff and said minor child of the 
parties hereto." In its interlocutory decree of divorce, the 
trial court, in four separate paragraphs ordered (1) that plain-
tiff be granted a divorce; (2) that piaintiff have the custody 
and control of the minor child; (3) that defendant pay to 
plaintiff "the sum of $60.00 per month as and for the su.pport 
and maintenance of said plaintiff and the minor child of the 
parties hereto, said payments commencing forthwith and 
continuing in a like sum on the 23rd day of each and every 
month thereafter" (emphasis added) ; (4) that "IT Is FUR-
THER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Property 
Settlement Agreement made and entered into between the 
parties hereto on the 12th day of March, 1948, be, and the 
same is hereby approved and ratified, and the terms thereof 
are incorporated herein with the same force and effect as if 
set forth in full herein." It therefore clearly appears that 
both the plaintiff and the court considered that the provision 
for monthly payments was a separate and distinct thing from 
the property settlement. The original complaint did not 
pray for court approval of the property settlement agreement 
and the court specifically so found in the case at bar. The 
complaint set forth, merely, that there was no community 
property because it had been theretofore divided between the 
parties and prayed for, on the ground of need, the sum of 
$60 per month as support for plaintiff and the minor child. 
Paragraph FOURTH reads as follows: "That each party does 
hereby waive and quitclaim any right to share in the estate 
of the other party, either under a Will or by the laws of 
succession, or by family allowance, or otherwise." (Emphasis 
added.) Paragraph FIFTH reads as follows: "That each 
party does hereby accept the provisions herein made for him 
or for her in full satisfaction of his or her right to the 
community property of the parties, or other property acquired 
after marriage by either party, and in full satisfaction of his 
or her right, if any, to alimony or support and maintenance. 
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Neither party shall at any time hereafter contract any debt, 
charge, or liability against the property or estate of the other 
party, and, in the event either party shall do so, he or she 
Wt11 save the other party harmless and free from loss ocro-
noned by such act." (Emphasis added.) 
The provisions of the agreement relating to the division 
of property were incorporated by reference in paragraph 
SIXTH of the decree and ratified and approved by the court. 
The provision for the monthly payments for the support and 
maintenance of the plaintiff and the minor child of the parties 
was set forth in full in paragraph FIFTH of the decree of 
divorce thus indicating that the court, as well as the parties, 
intended the provision as something separate and apart from 
the property settlement provisions of the agreement. This 
provision was therefore merged in the judgment (Hough v. 
Hough, 26 Cal.2d 605 [160 P.2d 15]). Each party did, by 
the terms of the agreement, specifically waive any and all right 
to share in the estate of the other, which provision is ines-
capable proof that the support payments were not to continue 
after the death of the one obligated therefor. In the majority 
opinion it is said that "It is also obvious that the fourth 
paragraph refers only to any rights to share in the estate 
not otherwise provided for in the agreement." (Empha"is 
added.) In so holding the majority is writing something hlto 
both the agreement and decree contrary to the intentions !)f 
the parties and the court. The court treated the supp< rt 
provision as something entirely separate and apart from 1 he 
agreement. The property of the parties was evenly divid ed 
and plaintiff in her complaint alleged that "there is no COlD-
munity property" and prayed for support for herself and 
the child on the ground of need. It would appear that ha,i 
she considered the monthly payment provision as part of thtl 
community property settlement agreement her complaint 
would have been differently worded. In Pat·ker v. Parker, 
193 Ca1. 478, 481 [225 P. 447], it was held that provision for 
permanent alimony is founded upon the legal obligation which 
the law imposes upon the husband to support the wife, and 
"that obligation comes to an end upon the death of either 
spouse. So, regardless of the language used by a court in 
making a provision in its decree for the payment of alimony, 
that provision ceases to be effective upon the death of either 
spouse. But here we have a provision [based upon an agree-
ment to pay the support during the lifetime of the wife] 
based upon an agreement of the parties, in effect a contract. 
) 
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It is not an award of permanent alimony, but an award of a 
life annuity given in lieu of a division of the property of the 
spouses. It rests not upon the obligation which the law 
imposes upon a husband to support his wife, but upon the con-
tract of the parties hereto." I have heretofore pointed out 
that a construction of the agreement as a whole (as we are 
bound to do) shows clearly that the monthly support payments 
were intended to be separate from the division of property 
and were not in lieu thereof; that each party waived any right 
in the estate of the other; that the court specificaUy set forth 
the provision for monthly payments in the decree which is 
now the sum and substance of the parties' rights. In Roberts 
v. Higgins, 122 Cal.App. 170 [9 P.2d 517], the court decree 
awarded support and maintenance to the wife and the appel-
late court held that alimony terminated on the death of either 
party. The conclusion appears inescapable that the provision 
for support insofar as it relates to the plaintiff terminated 
upon the death of her former husband and that she has no 
claim against his estate for her support after his death. 
So far as the minor child of the parties is concerned a 
different problem is presented. We held in Taylor v. George, 
34 Cal.2d .552 [212 P.2d 505], that "In California the rule 
is that the obligation of a father to support his minor child 
which is fixed by divorce decree or property settlement agree-
ment, does not cease upon the father's death, but survives as 
a charge against his estate. (Newma'll v. Burwell, 216 Cal. 608 
[15 P.2d 511] ; Estate of Smith, 200 Cal. 654 [254 P. 567] ; 
Estate of Oaldwell, 129 Cal.App. 613 [19 P.2d 9].)" In the 
Newman case 8'Upra, the decree had provided that the father 
pay a certain sum monthly to plaintiff for the support of the 
minor child of the parties "until further order of court." 
This court held that such an obligation continued after the 
death of the father and during the minority of the child. "And 
rightfuUy so, for it is the solemn duty of every father to 
support his children during their minority, and if he fails 
to do so, every principle of justice demands that they be thus 
supported out of his estate." (Pp. 612·613.) 
In view of the conclusion reached by me that the monthly 
support provision of the agreement and decree was intended 
by the court and the parties to be severable from the provi-
sions relating to property division in the agreement and not 
an integrated part thereof, I would reverse the judgment 
with directions to the trial court to determine what portion 
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of the child and the amount necessary to support him during 
his minority. It follows from what I have heretofore said 
that plaintiff is entitled to no part of the decedent's estate 
and her claim against his estate for her support should be 
disallowed. 
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-I concur in the conclusion and, 
generally, in the discussion by Mr. Justice Carter but do not 
agree that the property settlement agreement was, or could 
be, effectively incorporated in the decree by a mere reference. 
(See my concurring opinion in Flynn v. Flynn (1954), 42 
Cal.2d 55, 61-62 [265 P.2d 865], and my dissenting opinion 
in Messenger v. Messenger (1956), 46 Ca1.2d 619, 637 [297 
P.2d 988].) 
In addition to Justice Carter's discussion it may be pointed 
out that the provisions of the document entitled "Property 
Settlement Agreement," whether considered alone or together 
with the allegations of plaintiff's complaint for divorce and 
the terms of the interlocutory and final decrees of divorce, 
appear to preclude the construction placed upon the agree-
ment by the trial court and the majority of this court. Rather, 
in my view, the agreement, the complaint for divorce, the 
divorce decrees, and the conduct of plaintiff and her former 
husband combine to demonstrate that the monthly payments 
were intended to be for alimony to the wife and support of 
the child, and the contrary determination of the trial court 
herein as to the alimony payments is untenable. 
The complaint for divorce alleged "That there is flO com-
munity property the result of said marriage of the parties 
hereto, a property settlement agreement hatting been entered 
into • •• That plaintiff cloes not have 8'Uffi~ent money, means 
or property with which to support and maintain herself and 
the minor child of the parties hereto, and that • • . $60.00 
per month is a reasonable and necessary sum . . • for the 
support and maintenance of said plaintiff and said minor 
child." (Italics added.) The complaint prayed for "$60.00, 
per month, for the support and maintenance of plaintiff and 
said minor child." (Italics added.) This is far from being 
a prayer for an order directing specific performance of a 
property settlement agreement, and following such prayer, the 
interlocutory decree ordered the husband to pay $60 a month 
"for the support and maintenance of said plaintiff and the 
minor child," not as specific performance of a property settle-
ment agreement. (Italics added.) 
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and the order of the interlocutory decree are in accord with 
the provision of the agreement (paragraph 16) that "Subject 
to the approval by any Court of competent jurisdiction, 
Husband agrees to pay to Wife .•. [$60] per month as and 
for the support and maintenance of Wife and the minor 
child." (Italics added.) The general provisions of para-
graphs 1, 5, and 18, quoted in the majority opinion (pp. 278, 
279, do not overcome the specific provision of paragraph 
16 as to support. 
Plaintiff's allegations in the divorce action that "there is no 
community property . • ., a property settlement agreement 
having been entered into," and that "plaintiff does not have 
sufficient money, means or property with which to support 
• • . herself . • .," are highly persuasive that what plaintiff 
sought for herself in the divorce action was alimony, as such, 
not specific enforcement of a property settlement agreement, 
as to which no issue was raised. If plaintiff were in fact 
seeking a decree ordering performance of a property settle-
ment agreement she could and should have sought its approval 
and a decree literally incorporating it in the judgment and 
ordering defendant to perform its covenants. 
The conduct of plaintiff in praying in the divorce action 
for support for herself and the child is consistent only with 
the view that the payments provided by paragraph 16 of the 
agreement were, as to plaintiff, for support, that is, alimony. 
Furthermore, plaintiff's subsequent conduct in "stipulating" 
to and accepting a reduction in the amount of the payments, 
although the agreement contained no provision particularly 
directed to a change of such amount, indicates that plaintiff 
as well as the former husband considered and treated the 
payments as alimony and suppor1;, subject to court order 
and not as a part of the division of property. 
In these circumstances the rule quoted in the majority 
opinion (p. 279) from Messenger v. Messenger (1956), supra, 
46 Ca1.2d 619, 628, can have no application. Plaintiff 
wife did not treat the support provision of the agreement 
here as an "integral and inseparable part" of the property 
settlement portions of the agreement; she treated it, her 
former husband treated it, and in accord with their position 
the trial court in the divorce proceeding treated it, as an 
agreement for support and alimony in addition to, not as an 
integral part of, the settlement of their property rights. 
From the foregoing conclusion that the payments decreed 
«c.M-1e 
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to the wife are alimony and child support, it follows that the 
obligation to make such payments terminated with the death 
of the former husband insofar as such payments are alimony 
(Miller v. Superior Court (1937), 9 Cal.2d 733, 737 [72 P.2d 
868]; Parker v. Parker (19M), 193 Cal. 478, 481 [225 P. 
447]; Hamilton v. Hamilton (1949), 94 Cal.App.2d 293, 
298 [210 P.2d 750] ; Roberts v. Higgins (1932), 122 Cal.App. 
170, 171 [9 P.2d 517]), although the obligation survives 
during the child's minority insofar as the payments are child 
support (TayZor v. George (1949), 34 Cal.2d 552, 556 [212 
P.2d 505] ; Ne'UJ'l7Ul,n v. Burwell (1932),216 Cal. 608, 612 [15 
P.2d 511]). 
I would reverse the judgment with directions consistent 
with the foregoing views. 
Shenk, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied December 
12,1956. Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., were of the 
opinion that the petition should be granted. . 
